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Stochastic dominance plays an important role in decision making when decision 
maker’s risk preference represented by his or her utility function is not provided. 
However, it is limited to the case where several alternatives with certain risk profiles 
expressed with unique distribution functions are compared. Under real life 
circumstances, sometimes decision maker has to make a choice given imprecise 
information where each alternative’s risk profile cannot be expressed with a single 
distribution function. Montes, Miranda and Montes (2014) proposed a method called 
imprecise stochastic dominance which stays at the level of first-order stochastic 
dominance. To extend this concept, second-order imprecise stochastic dominance is 
proposed, relevant properties are studied and several cases are provided to illustrate its 
usage. Furthermore, to make it applicable in more general cases, a compromised 
version of second-order imprecise stochastic dominance is proposed, namely 
compromised second-order imprecise stochastic dominance. To further help decision 
makers to understand the level of confidence they can have, decision made under 
compromised second-order imprecise stochastic dominance comes with two 
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1.1 BACKGROUND  
It is very common that people make decisions of choosing one from a number 
of options. Daily life is full of instances where people make choices as said in 
the famous quote “life is a series of choices”. Moreover, most business or 
economic activities involve decision making.  
        A decision maker may perform decision analysis according to his or her 
risk preference represented by utility function. However, utility function may 
not be taken into consideration due to reasons such as risk preference being 
unknown or decision maker prefers not to use risk preference for analysis. In 
these cases, stochastic dominance analysis may help decision maker choose 
from a number of alternatives without the knowledge of his utility function. 
The stochastic dominance analysis requires firstly the specification of the 
alternatives' probability distributions over outcomes, in most cases expressed 
by cumulative distribution functions and secondly the assumption that the 
decision maker is maximizing his or her expected utility, which is expressed 
as a non-decreasing utility function, in the spirit of expected utility theory by 
von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947). 
        Though it is very useful, the original concept of stochastic dominance is 
limited to the case where each alternative has certain risk profile expressed 
with a single distribution function, which assumes that probability 
distributions are known and unique. However, specifying unique probability 
distributions may not be justified, primarily because of ambiguity of 
information. Hence, this simplification of problem might not be applicable 
under real life circumstances. More generally, decision maker has to make a 
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choice under imprecise information where information is available yet not 
precise enough to express each alternative’s risk profile with a single 
distribution function. This uncertainty in risk profile may have several 
different forms, for example an alternative has a set of varied risk profiles or it 
can vary in an interval of probabilities for each outcome value. For the first 
case, Montes, Miranda and Montes(2014) proposed a method called imprecise 
stochastic dominance. However, it only stays at the level of first-order 
stochastic dominance. Hence it applies to the most straitforward case in 
stochastic analysis and it is not as widely used as second-order stochastic 
dominance.  
        The goal of this thesis is to extend the notion of imprecise stochastic 
dominance to second-order and make it applicable for both the situations 
where sets of distribution functions are compared or distribution functions 
with probability represented in intervals are compared. 
1.2 ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
A literature review of stochastic dominance is presented in Chapter 2, 
including both the stochastic dominance concept by Hadar and Russell (1969) 
and Hanoch and Levy (1969) and other newly developped concepts. Chapter 2 
also dicusses the current notion of imprecise stochastic dominance by Montes, 
Miranda and Montes(2014) and the necessity to extend it to second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance. In Chapter 3, the definitions of second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance (SISD) and compromised second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance (CSISD) are proposed. The rational choices 
under these two definitions are introduced with their proofs provided. Though 
rational choices under both these relations guaratee the maximisation of 
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expected utility, they differ from each other in the way that: on one hand, the 
relation second-order imprecise stochastic dominance guarantees that taking 
any distributions from two alternatives, one alternative always dominates the 
other; while on the other hand, the relation compromised second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance only guarantees the overall expected utility of 
one alternative is always higher than the other. This leads to the definitions of 
two other indicators, called dominance-level indicators, to show the level of 
confidence that an individual can have when using compromised second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance to make choice among alternatives. Chapter 3 
ends with relevant properties of both the definitions discussed. Chapter 4 
shows their application through two illustrative cases. Chapter 5 summarizes 















2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
     
Since the utility foundation of stochastic dominance analysis built by Hadar 
and Russell (1969, 1971), Hanoch and Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1970, 1971) and Whitmore (1970), a number of definitions related to 
stochastic dominance have been proposed. 
        Levy (1992) summarized first-order and second-order stochastic 
dominance as follows. 
2.1 FIRST-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Let F and G be the cumulative distribution functions of two distinct uncertain 
options, X and Y. X first-order stochastically dominates Y, denoted by 
𝑋 ≻𝐹𝑆𝐷 𝑌, if 
𝐹(𝑥) ≤ 𝐺(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝐹(𝑥) < 𝐺(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
2.2 RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER FIRST-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
If the outcomes of alternative X first-order stochastically dominates that of 
alternative Y, and if the utility function u(W) is non-decreasing, then 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)] 
and alternative X is preferred to alternative Y. 
        The proof is given in Appendix A, as the proof in Section 3.3.1 and in 
Section 3.5.1 make use of similar techniques. 
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2.3 SECOND-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Let F and G be the cumulative distribution functions of two distinct uncertain 
options, X and Y. X second-order stochastically dominates Y, denoted by 
𝑋 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷  𝑌, if 
∫ [𝐺(𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0      
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝐺(𝑥) ≠ 𝐹(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
        Notice that first-order stochastic dominance implies second-order 
stochastic dominance but the reverse is not necessarily true.  
2.4 RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER SECOND-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
If the outcomes of alternative X second-order stochastically dominates that of 
alternative Y, and if the utility function u(W) is non-decreasing concave, 
meaning that the decision maker is risk averse, then 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)], 
and alternative X is preferred to alternative Y. 
          The proof is given in Appendix B, as the proof in Section 3.3.1 and in 
Section 3.5.1 make use of similar techniques. 
2.5 FIRST-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Imprecise stochastic dominance can be used under the situations where the 
available information does not allow us to single out a unique probability 
measure for all random variables involved. 
          Montes, Miranda and Montes (2014) introduced the concept of 
imprecise stochastic dominance for the purpose to extend the notion of 
stochastic dominance to the case where they consider sets of probability 
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distributions instead of a single one for each alternative. As a consequence, 
they work within the theory of imprecise probabilities. They make use of an 
important idea in imprecise probabilities namely p-box (Ferson, Kreinovich, 
Ginzburg, Myers, & Sentz, 2003), which is short for probability-box and is 
defined as follows. 
          A p-box ( 𝐹, 𝐹) is a set of cumulative distribution functions bounded 
between two finitely additive distribution functions 𝐹 ≤  𝐹 for all x in X which 
is a random variable. An example of p-box is shown in Figure 2.1. 𝐹 is 
referred to as lower distribution function and  𝐹 is referred to as upper 
distribution function of the p-box. They are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 p-box 
          Therefore, if there is a set of distributions F, then 𝐹 and 𝐹 are 
determined by 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝐹(𝑥) , 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝐹(𝑥)      ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
          To date, the study on imprecise stochastic dominance only stays at the 
level of first-order stochastic dominance. The definition is given by Montes, 
Miranda and Montes (2014) as follows. 
          Let X1, X2 be two random variables. Let F1, F2 be their associated sets of 
distribution functions. X1 is said (first-order imprecisely) stochastically 





1. For every 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 and 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2, it holds that 𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2,  
2. There is some 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 such that 𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2 for every 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2, 
3. For every 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2, there is some 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1such that 𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2, 
4. There are 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1, 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 such that 𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2,  
5. There is 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 such that  𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2 for every 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1, 
6. For every 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1, there is 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 such that 𝑓1 ≤ 𝑓2.  
          The notion “𝑓1 ≤  𝑓2” means that 𝑓1(𝑥) ≤  𝑓2(𝑥) for all 𝑥. 
          This definition stays at the level of first-order stochastic dominance. 
Therefore it is necessrary to propose another notion, namely second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance and will be introduced in Chapter 3. 
2.6 OTHER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE RELATIONS  
In some situation, there is no stochastic dominance yet it seems that most 
decision makers do have a preference of one alternative over the other. In this 
case, stochastic dominance rules do not reveal this preference due to some 
extreme utility functions because of a very small violation of the rules. Such 
strict rules for all utility functions are not necessary as those extreme utility 
functions rarely represent investors' preference. Leshno and Levy (2002) 
defined almost stochastic dominance to reveal the choice which conforms to 
most decision makers but not all of them. Furthermore, Tan (2015) defines 
weighted almost stochastic dominance by introducing a weight function to 
characterize most individuals’ preferences in St. Petersburg paradox. 
          Quite often, decision makers are facing situation where the values of 
random variables are not completely known. If random variables take values 
as fuzzy intervals, they are known as fuzzy random variables using the 
concept of fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965). According to Schuymer, Meyer and 
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Baets’s paper published in 2003, they introduced a concept in the framework 
of fuzzy preference modelling called reciprocal relation Q and argued that it is 
a fuzzy alternative of stochastic dominance. In another paper Haven (2003) 
summarizes this concept as fuzzy stochastic dominance. 
          In some other cases, stochastic dominance is insufficient for decision 
making when decision makers experience regret. Tan and Hartman (2013) 
introduced the concept of regret-theoretic dominance and regret dominance to 




















3 SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND 
COMPROMISED SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
 
3.1 MOTIVATION           
To explain the definitions presented later in this thesis, it is important to set a 
sound foundation of the problem context. Hence, this part discusses about the 
origins of imprecision in information with examples. 
        In most decision making process, several alternatives are assessed 
according to their risk profiles (probability distributions of outcome). The 
chosen alternative should provide the best trade-off between pay-back and 
related risk.  
        Consider the Party Problem which was firstly proposed by Howard 
(1966):  
Example 3.1 (Howard, 1966). Kim wants to decide on the location to hold a 
party tomorrow. She has three choices: outdoors, porch and indoors. It is 
necessary to take into consideration of tomorrow’s weather to make the 
decision. The equivalent dollar values of different possible outcomes are listed 
below: 
Table 3.1 Party Problem 










        In the case that the information given is precise, for example the 
probability that it will rain tomorrow is given as 60%, the decision tree is as 
follows: 
 
Figure 3.1 Party Problem – Decision Tree 
       Then the excess probability distribution for each alternative is as follows: 
 
Figure 3.2 Party Problem – Excess Cumulative Distributions 
          According to stochastic dominance analysis, it is reasonable to conclude 
that there is no first-order stochastic dominance in this problem, but “Outdoors” 
is second-order stochastically dominated by both “Indoors” and “Porch”. To 
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simplify the problem, only two options, namely “Outdoors” and “Indoors” will 
be considered in the following part. 
          However ambiguity may lead to imprecision in information. In decision 
model, there are mainly three factors, probability, outcome and decision 
maker’s preference expressed with utility function. As stochastic dominance 
analysis is applied, utility function is not taken into consideration. As a result, 
only imprecision in probability and outcome is considered.  
          According to Camerer and Weber (1992), ambiguity is often present in 
decision making in two senses: ambiguity about probability and ambiguity 
about outcome. In the first sense, ambiguity about probabilities refers to the 
situation where the probability of an event is not precisely known. Thus, 
ambiguity results from the uncertainty associated with specifying which of a 
set of distributions is appropriate in a given situation. In the second sense, 
ambiguity about outcomes refers to the situation where the outcome or utility 
function is not specified. That is, the decision maker may not be sure how to 
evaluate the outcome of an alternative in the attribute space. Considering both 
senses of ambiguity, four classes of decision making are summarized in Table 
3.2.  
Table 3.2 Four Classes of Decision Making (Walley, 1991) 
 No ambiguity on outcomes Ambiguity on outcomes 
No ambiguity on 
probabilities 
Case I:Point probabilities 
and single-valued mappings 
Case II: Point probabilities 
and multivalued mappings 
Ambiguity on  
probabilities 
Case III: Probability 
intervals and single-valued 
mappings  
Case IV: Probability 




          In Case I, there is no ambiguity at all, neither on probability nor on 
outcome. Since the utility function is known, decision maker can directly use 
utility function to decide and it is not necessary to use stochastic dominance 
analysis. In Case II, utility function is not precisely known, hence the decision 
maker needs to make use of stochastic dominance analysis. In Case III, there 
is ambiguity on probability yet the utility function is specified. Same as Case I, 
due to the specification of utility function, it is not necessary to apply 
stochastic dominance analysis. Case IV is the most complicated since there is 
ambiguity on both probability and outcome. The decision maker would need 
to conduct stochastic dominance analysis using imprecise information. In this 
thesis, only Case IV is considered.  
          The ambiguity on probability may come from the following list of 
reasons and are described with details in 3.1.1 to 3.1.4: 
1. Aggregation of experts’ opinions 
2. Lack of information 
3. Confidence interval 
4. Limited experiment to obtain risk profile 
3.1.1 Aggregation of experts’ opinions  
Example 3.2 (Gajdos, Tallon & Vergnaud, 2004). A decision maker asks 
two experts to assess the probability of occurrence of a given event. The first 
expert comes up with the evaluation 1 (the event will occur with probability 1) 
while the second expert comes up with the evaluation 0 (the event will occur 
with probability 0). If the decision maker acknowledges the disagreement 
among the experts, he will keep both distributions. This can be extended to 
models representing situations in which scientific theories compete for 
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explaining a particular phenomenon. Scientific theories are then viewed as 
probability distributions over a state space. 
          In the Party Problem, one possible imprecision of information of this 
type can be: 
Example 3.3. Kim asks three weather stations about tomorrow’s weather. 
Station A reports that the probability is 60%, Station B tells her 55% while 
Station C claims that it is 50%. Thus, for each of the alternatives, they have 
three different distributions corresponding to three different probabilities of 
tomorrow being rainy. Then all the possible distributions for the alternative 
“Outdoors” are as in Figure 3.3. The upper bound 𝐹 is distribution C and the 
lower bound 𝐹 is distribution A. 
 
Figure 3.3 Outdoors 
          Therefore, the p-box for the alternative “Outdoors” is as follows, 
 
Figure 3.4 P-box for “Outdoors” 
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          Then the following graph Figure 3.5 can be drawn including p-boxes for 
both options: 
 
Figure 3.5 Party Problem - Aggregation of Experts’ Opinions 
          Under this situation, Kim actually needs to compare two sets of 
distribution functions. More generally, if Kim is provided with n values of 
probability that it will rain tomorrow, then she needs to compare 2 sets, each 
with n distribution functions.  
3.1.2 Lack of information 
Example 3.4. Suppose weather forecasting information is not available for 
Kim. According to Kim’s experience, she can estimate from the look of the 
moon tonight that the probability it will rain tomorrow is about 50% to 60%. 
Then the Figure 3.6 can be drawn. 
 
Figure 3.6 Party Problem – Lack of Information 
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          For each alternative, values of the whole area bounded by the two 
different distribution functions are possible because probability is given in an 
interval. Here, Kim has to compare distributions with probability represented 
in intervals. 
3.1.3 Confidence interval 
In statistic studies, given a set of sample data, a confidence interval can be 
calculated to give an estimated range of values which is likely to include an 
unknown population parameter. At level 𝛼, 𝑃𝜃∗{𝜃
∗ ∈ 𝐼(𝑛, 𝛼)} ≥ 1 − 𝛼, where 
𝜃∗ is the theoretical population parameter of interest, 𝐼(𝑛, 𝛼) is the confidence 
interval at level 𝛼 derived from a set of  𝑛 data. (Cox & Hinkley, 1974) 
          Consider the common practice of sampling a given population to assess 
the probability p of a certain appearance in this population, it is a common 
practice in statistics to give a 95% confidence interval of p.  
3.1.4 Limited experiment to obtain risk profile  
Example 3.5 - Three color urns (Ellsberg, 1961). A decision maker has to 
bet over the color of a ball drawn from an urn. In the urn, 30 balls are red 
while each of the other 60 balls can be either black or yellow. 
          The proportion of black or yellow balls in the urn is crucial for making a 
good decision. If two trials are provided to him before making a bet and the 
result are “black ball” and “yellow ball”, he may roughly estimate that half of 
the 60 balls are black. However, this estimation is not reliable due to the 
limited number of experiments. Hence, the information is imprecise.  
          Though the two cases do not apply to the Party Problem, they are very 
common in other problems. The reasons leading to imprecision of information 
listed here are not exhaustive. 
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          For these reasons, it is necessary to extend the concept of stochastic 
dominance to be used with imprecise information. However, in Example 3.3 
and Example 3.4 regarding the Party Problem, no conclusion can be drawn 
from first-order imprecise stochastic dominance proposed by Montes, Miranda 
and Montes (2014). This is because first-order imprecise stochastic dominance 
is only applicable to particular cases where one alternative is always better 
than the others no matter what the outcome is. Hence it is necessary to extend 
the concept of imprecise stochastic dominance to second-order. 
3.2 SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Definition 3.1 Let X1, X2 be two random variables with imprecise probability. 
F1, F2 are their associated sets of distribution functions represented by p-boxes  
( 𝐹1, 𝐹1 ) and ( 𝐹2, 𝐹2 ). X is the set of all the possible outcomes of these two 
distributions. X1 second-order imprecisely stochastically dominates X2, 
denoted by 𝑋1 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2, if: 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0         
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋    𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹1(𝑥) ≠ 𝐹2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
3.3 RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC 
DOMINANCE AND NON-DECREASING CONCAVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Theorem 3.1 If the outcomes of alternative 𝑋1 second-order imprecisely 
stochastically dominates that of alternative 𝑋2 and if the utility function u(W) 
is non-decreasing concave, meaning that the decision maker is risk averse, 
then 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)], 
and alternative X1 is preferred to alternative X2. 
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3.3.1 Proof for rational choice under second-order imprecise stochastic 
dominance and non-decreasing concave utility functions 
According to the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, if  
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0         
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋    𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹1(𝑥) ≠ 𝐹2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
then  
𝐹1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2. 
Since 
𝐹2(𝑥) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓  𝐹2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹1(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝐹1(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
then 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 
∫ [𝐹2(𝑡) − 𝑓2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0         
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹2(𝑥) ≠ 𝑓2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 
∫ [𝑓1(𝑡) − 𝐹1(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0         
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑓1(𝑥) ≠ 𝐹1(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
Therefore  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 
∫ [𝑓1(𝑡) − 𝑓2(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0         
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑓1(𝑥) ≠ 𝑓2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
which leads to 
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𝑓1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑓2      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 . 
According to the proof for rational choice under second order stochastic 
dominance (in Appendix B),   
𝐸𝑓1[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸𝑓2[𝑢(𝑋2)]     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 . 
Therefore  
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)]. 
3.4 COMPROMISED SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
The conditions of second-order imprecise stochastic dominance are strict. 
They are sufficient but not necessary to yield the result 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)]. 
Due to that reason, compromised second-order imprecise stochastic 
dominance is proposed. 
Definition 3.2 Let X1, X2 be two random variables with imprecise probability. 
F1, F2 are their associated sets of distribution functions represented by p-boxes  
( 𝐹1, 𝐹1 ) and ( 𝐹2, 𝐹2 ). Let M1, M2 be the mean distributions of F1 and F2, 
which will be defined in Definition 3.3. X is the set of all the possible 
outcomes of these two distributions. F1 compromised-second-order 
imprecisely stochastically dominates F2, denoted by 𝑋1 ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2, if 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0      
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞
≤ 0       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
∫ [𝑀1(𝑡) − 𝑀2(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0       
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑀1(𝑥) ≠ 𝑀2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
Remark 3.1 No conclusion can be drawn for all other situations.  
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Definition 3.3 Let X be a random variable with imprecise probability. F is its 
associated set of distribution functions represented by p-box ( 𝐹, 𝐹 ) . Mean 
distribution M is defined as   
𝑀(𝑥) = 𝐸[𝐹(𝑥)]        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
3.5 RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER COMPROMISED SECOND-ORDER IMPRECISE 
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE AND NON-DECREASING CONCAVE UTILITY 
FUNCTIONS 
Theorem 3.2 If the outcomes of alternative 𝑋1 compromised-second-order 
imprecisely stochastically dominates that of alternative 𝑋2, and if the utility 
function u(W) is non-decreasing concave, meaning that the decision maker is 
risk averse, then 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)], 
and alternative X1 is preferred to alternative X2. 
3.5.1 Proof for rational choice under compromised second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance and non-decreasing concave utility 
functions 
According to the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, if  
∫ [𝑀1(𝑡) − 𝑀2(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑥
−∞
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑀1(𝑥) ≠ 𝑀2(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
then  
𝑀1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑀2. 
According to the proof for rational choice under second order stochastic 
dominance (in Appendix B), 




𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] = 𝐸 [𝐸𝑓1[𝑢(𝑋1)]] = 𝐸𝑀1[𝑢(𝑋1)] 
where  𝐸𝑓1[𝑢(𝑋1)] represents the expected utility based on distribution 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 
and 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)] = 𝐸 [𝐸𝑓2[𝑢(𝑋2)]] = 𝐸𝑀2[𝑢(𝑋2)] 
where  𝐸𝑓2[𝑢(𝑋2)] represents the expected utility based on distribution 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2, 
therefore 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)]. 
3.6 DOMINANCE-LEVEL INDICATORS FOR COMPROMISED SECOND-ORDER 
IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Although both 𝑋1 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2 and 𝑋1 ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2 guarantees that 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋1)] >
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋2)], there is a difference between SISD and CSISD as discussed in the 
following. 
          It is shown that if 𝑋1 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2, 𝐸𝑓1[𝑢(𝑋1)] > 𝐸𝑓2[𝑢(𝑋2)]for all 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 
and 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 ,which means that alternative X1 has a higher expected utility 
value than X2, taking any pair of distributions from their sets of possible 
distributions respectively.            
         However it is not the case for CSISD. If 𝑋1 ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝑋2, it is easy to show 
that   
∃ 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2  ∃ 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1, 𝑓2  ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑓1, 
thus   
𝐸𝑓1[𝑢(𝑋1)] < 𝐸𝑓2[𝑢(𝑋2)]     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 , 
which implies that there exists certain pair of distributions from their sets of 
possible distributions that X1 does not have a higher expected utility than X2. 
In this context, if the decision maker chooses X1 over X2, there is risk involved.        
21 
 
          Therefore, it is necessary to study the level of confidence that a decision 
maker can have when using CSISD. In the following, the target is thus to 
visualize and quantify the level of confidence by introducing two dominance-
level indicators, 𝛼 and 𝛽. 
3.6.1.1 Dominance-level indicator 𝜶 
Definition 3.4 Let X1, X2 be two random variables with imprecise probability. 
F1, F2 are their associated sets of distribution functions represented by p-boxes  
( 𝐹1, 𝐹1 ) and ( 𝐹2, 𝐹2 ). Let 





, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
For the case where F1 is a set of distribution functions, 
𝛼 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐴
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐹1
， 
which is illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
In the example shown in Figure3.7,  
𝛼 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐴





For the case where F1 is a distribution function represented in intervals, 
𝛼 = 𝑃 ({𝜃: 𝑓1𝜃 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2}), 
where 𝜗 is the distribution parameter and 𝑓1𝜃 is the distribution in F1 with 
parameter 𝜗 taking the value of 𝜃. 







which is illustrated in Figure 3.9. 
Remark 3.2 𝛼 represents the proportion of distributions in F1 that dominates 
any distribution in F2 in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. In 
other words, it indicates the extent of confidence that the decision maker can 
have in F1. 
 
Figure 3.7 α in The Case of Sets of Distributions 
 




Figure 3.9 α in The Case of Distributions Represented with Intervals 
3.6.1.2 Dominance-level indicator 𝜷 
Definition 3.5 Let X1, X2 be two random variables with imprecise probability. 
F1, F2 are their associated sets of distribution functions represented by p-boxes  
( 𝐹1, 𝐹1 ) and ( 𝐹2, 𝐹2 ). Let 





, 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1 . 
For the case where F2 is a set of distribution functions, 
𝛽 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐹2
， 
which is illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
In the example in Figure3.10,  
𝛽 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵








Figure 3.10 β in The Case of Sets of Distributions 
For the case where F2 is a distribution function represented in intervals, 
𝛽 = 𝑃({𝜃 ∈ 𝜗: 𝐹1̅ ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑓2𝜃}), 
where 𝜗 is the distribution parameter and 𝑓2𝜃 is the distribution in F2 with 
parameter 𝜗 taking the value of 𝜃. 





which is illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
Remark 3.3 𝛽 represents the proportion of distributions in F2 that is 
dominated by any distribution in F1 in the sense of second-order stochastic 
dominance. Hence, it also indicates the extent of confidence that the decision 
maker can have in F1. 
Remark 3.4 Both 𝛼 and 𝛽 indicate the confidence level that a decision maker 
can have when using the compromised second-order imprecise stochastic 
dominance. Higher values show higher probability that the decision maker 




Figure 3.11 β in The Case of Distributions Represented with Intervals 
3.7 PROPERTY 
3.7.1 Relation between SISD and CSISD 
SISD implies CSISD, but the reverse is not necessarily true. 
Proof (SISD implies CSISD):  
Using the proof in Appendix B, if  
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑥
−∞
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹1 ≠ 𝐹2      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
 then   
𝐹1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2, 
since 
𝐹1(𝑡) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓  𝐹2(𝑡)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ [0,1] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐹2(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝐹1(𝑡)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ [0,1]. 
It is easy to show that 
𝑓1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑓2      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹2 , 
which leads to 
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𝐹1̅  ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2̅̅̅, 
 𝐹1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷  𝐹2 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑀1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹1̅ ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑀2, 
which implies 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑥
−∞
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞
≤ 0      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑  




𝑀1(𝑥) ≠ 𝑀2(𝑥)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
Hence SISD implies CSISD. 
3.7.2 Transitive  
Both SISD and CSISD are transitive. 
Proof (SISD is transitive): 
Let F1, F2 and F3 three sets of distributions. If  
𝐹1  ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹2, 
then 





𝐹1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹2̅̅̅. 
If  
𝐹2  ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹3, 
same procedure can be used to get 𝐹2 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹3̅̅̅. 
Since SSD is transitive, 
27 
 
𝐹1 ≻𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝐹3̅̅̅, 
thus 





𝐹1  ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹3. 
Hence SISD is transitive. 
Proof (CSISD is transitive): 
Let F1, F2 and F3 three sets of distributions. If  
𝐹1  ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹2  ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹3,  
then  
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞
≤ 0     
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  
𝑎𝑛𝑑  
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 < 0 𝑜𝑟 ∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹2(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞





∫ [𝐹2(𝑡) − 𝐹3̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∫ [𝐹2(𝑡) − 𝐹3(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞
≤ 0      
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  
𝑎𝑛𝑑  
∫ [𝐹2(𝑡) − 𝐹3̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 < 0 𝑜𝑟 ∫ [𝐹2(𝑡) − 𝐹3(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞




It is not hard to show that  






      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹3̅̅̅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 < 0 𝑜𝑟 ∫ [𝐹1(𝑡) − 𝐹3(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞







𝐹1  ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐹3. 
Hence CSISD is transitive. 
3.7.3 Antisymmetric 
Both SISD and CSISD are antisymmetric. 
Proof (SISD and CSISD are antisymmetric) 
It is easy to prove using transitivity:  
Assume  𝐴 and 𝐵 are sets of distinctive distributions respectively,  
𝐴 ≠ 𝐵, 𝐴 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐵 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐴, 
then by transitivity: 
𝐴 ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐴, 
which contradicts with the assumption. Therefore A=B. 
Following similar procedures, it is easy to show that CSISD is also 
antisymmetric.  
3.7.4 Reflexive 










4 ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
This thesis studies two cases to show the application of second-order 
imprecise stochastic dominance and compromised second-order imprecise 
stochastic dominance proposed above in both situations where sets of 
distribution functions are compared and distribution functions with probability 
represented in intervals are compared. 
4.1.1 Comparing sets of distribution functions 
Example 4.1. A charity institution wants to collect donation from people 
entering a shopping mall. Assume the number of arriving customers per unit 
of time is a random variable following Poisson distribution with parameter λ. 
There are two shopping malls but the decision maker has to choose one of 
them due to limited manpower. Before making the decision, he obtains data of 
each shopping mall’s arrival rate from three sources. Shopping mall A is with 
𝜆𝐴 ∈ {1.8, 2, 2.1} and the average donation per person is 1 dollar while 
shopping mall B has 𝜆𝐵 ∈ {8, 8.3, 8.7} but the average donation per person is 
0.2 dollar. 
            The distributions for shopping mall A and B are as follows.  
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λ=1.8 λ=2 λ=2.1
𝐹: λ = 1.8 




Figure 4.2 Shopping Mall B 
 
Figure 4.3 Upper and Lower Distributions for A and B 
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𝐹: λ = 8 
𝐹: λ = 8.7 
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      Let 𝐹𝐴 and 𝐹𝐵 be the cumulative distribution functions of the outcome of 
choosing shopping mall A and shopping mall B respectively.     
      The following tables are obtained after calculation: 
Table 4.1 Charity Problem - Upper bound and Lower bound data 
 𝑭𝑨: λ=1.8 𝑭𝑨 ∶ λ=2.1 𝑭𝑩 ∶ λ=8 𝑭𝑩: λ=8.7 
x 
        
0 0.165 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.463 0.165 0.380 0.122 0.191 0.000 0.135 0.000 
2 0.731 0.628 0.650 0.502 0.816 0.192 0.741 0.135 
3 0.891 1.359 0.839 1.152 0.992 1.007 0.983 0.876 
4 0.964 2.250 0.938 1.990 1.000 1.999 1.000 1.859 
5 0.990 3.214 0.980 2.928 1.000 2.999 1.000 2.859 
6 0.997 4.203 0.994 3.908 1.000 3.999 1.000 3.859 
7 0.999 5.201 0.999 4.902 1.000 4.999 1.000 4.859 
8 1.000 6.200 1.000 5.900 1.000 5.999 1.000 5.859 
 
Table 4.2 Charity Problem - Mean Distribution Data 
x 
    
0 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.416 0.141 0.164 0.000 
2 0.686 0.557 0.781 0.164 
3 0.862 1.243 0.988 0.945 
4 0.950 2.105 1.000 1.933 
5 0.984 3.055 1.000 2.932 
6 0.996 4.039 1.000 3.932 
7 0.999 5.035 1.000 4.932 
8 1.000 6.034 1.000 5.932 




 ∫ 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 𝐹𝐵(𝑥) 𝐹𝑩(𝑥) ∫ 𝐹𝐵(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0




𝑀𝐴(𝑥) 𝑀𝐵(𝑥) ∫ 𝑀𝐴(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0






Table 4.3 Charity Problem - Calculation Results 






0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.122 -0.122 -0.165 -0.141 
2 -0.310 -0.367 -0.437 -0.393 
3 -0.144 -0.275 -0.351 -0.298 
4 0.009 -0.131 -0.251 -0.173 
5 0.071 -0.069 -0.215 -0.122 
6 0.091 -0.049 -0.204 -0.107 
7 0.097 -0.043 -0.202 -0.102 
8 0.099 -0.041 -0.201 -0.101 
 
It is clear that  
(𝑎) ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)]  𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑥
0
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋   
is not true,  
(𝑏) ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑥
0
𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
≤ 0        
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,   
∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
< 0 𝑜𝑟 ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
< 0     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋   
𝑎𝑛𝑑   
 ∫ [𝑀1(𝑡) − 𝑀2(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0,   
𝑥
0
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋     
is true.  
Therefore (a) does not imply any conclusion. 
However (b) implies that  
𝐵 ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐴. 
∫ [𝐹𝑩(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝐹𝑩(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝐹𝑩(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0






          This case shows that a problem satisfying CSISD does not necessarily 
satisfy SISD. In other words, CSISD is not a sufficient condition for SISD. 
Hence, the result shown here is consistent with Property 3.7.1, which implies 
that SISD is a stricter criteria than CSISD.  
        The dominance-level indicators can be calculated in the following way. 
Table 4.4 Charity Problem - Calculation Results to Obtain α 
x 
   
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 
2 -0.310 -0.337 -0.367 
3 -0.144 -0.201 -0.275 
4 0.009 -0.051 -0.131 
5 0.071 0.011 -0.069 
6 0.091 0.031 -0.049 
7 0.097 0.037 -0.043 
8 0.099 0.039 -0.041 
 
Table 4.5 Charity Problem - Calculation Results to Obtain β 
x 
   
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.165 -0.135 -0.122 
2 -0.437 -0.350 -0.310 
3 -0.351 -0.211 -0.144 
4 -0.251 -0.076 0.009 
5 -0.215 -0.023 0.071 
6 -0.204 -0.007 0.091 
7 -0.202 -0.002 0.097 
8 -0.201 -0.001 0.099 
 
∫ [𝑓𝜆=8(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝑓𝜆=8.3(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0




∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑓𝜆=1.8(𝑡)] 𝑑t 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑓𝜆=2(𝑡)] 𝑑t 
𝑥
0






          According to the calculation results in Table 4.4,  




Hence  𝑓𝜆=8 does not dominate 𝐹𝐴 in the sense of SSD.  




Hence  𝑓𝜆=8.3 does not dominate 𝐹𝐴 in the sense of SSD.  




Hence  𝑓𝜆=8.7 dominates 𝐹𝐴 in the sense of SSD.  
          Therefore  
𝛼 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐴





which means that 33% of the distributions in option B dominate all 
distributions in option A in the sense of SSD. 
          Similarly, according to the calculation results in Table 4.5,  
(1) ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑓𝜆=1.8(𝑡)] 𝑑t 
𝑥
0
≤ 0,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  is true. 
Hence  𝐹𝐵 dominates 𝑓𝜆=1.8 in the sense of SSD.  
(2) ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑓𝜆=2(𝑡)] 𝑑t 
𝑥
0
≤ 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  is true. 
Hence  𝐹𝐵 dominates 𝑓𝜆=2 in the sense of SSD.  
(3) ∫ [𝐹𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑓𝜆=2.1(𝑡)] 𝑑t 
𝑥
0
≤ 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  is not true. 
Hence  𝐹𝐵 does not dominate 𝑓𝜆=2.1 in the sense of SSD.  
          Therefore  
𝛽 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐹𝐵





which means that 66.7% of distributions in option A are dominated by all 
distributions in option B in the sense of SSD. 
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          In conclusion, option B does not dominate option A in the sense of 
second-order imprecise stochastic dominance. However it dominates option A 
in the sense of compromised second-order imprecise stochastic dominance 
with dominance-level indicators 𝛼 =
1
3




4.1.2 Comparing distribution functions with probability represented in 
intervals 
To explain cases of this type, a new version of the Party Problem is proposed 
in this thesis as follows. 
Example 4.2 (A new version of the Party Problem). Kim wants to decide on 
the location to hold a party tomorrow. She has only two choices: outdoors and 
Porch. It is necessary to take into consideration of tomorrow’s weather to 
make the decision. It can be sunny, windy or rainy tomorrow. The equivalent 
dollar values of different possible outcomes are listed below: 
Table 4.6 New Party Problem 










        
          There is 30% to 40% of probability that it will be rainy, 20% to 30% 
that it will be windy. Then the excess probability distribution for each 




Figure 4.5 New Party Problem - Porch 
 
Figure 4.6 New Party Problem – Outdoors 
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Figure 4.8 New Party Problem - Mean Distributions for Porch and Outdoors 
          Let 𝐹𝐴 and 𝐹𝐵 be the cumulative distribution functions of the outcome of 
holding the party in the porch and outdoors respectively. The following tables 
are obtained after calculation: 
Table 4.7 New Party Problem Data 
 𝑭𝑨 𝑭𝑨 𝑭𝑩 𝑭𝑩 
x         
0 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.3 0.000 0.4 0.000 
20 0.3 0.000 0.4 0.000 0.3 6.000 0.4 8.000 
40 0.3 6.000 0.4 8.000 0.5 12.000 0.7 16.000 
70 0.5 15.000 0.7 20.000 0.5 27.000 0.7 37.000 
90 0.5 25.000 0.7 34.000 1 37.000 1 51.000 









0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Mean Porch Mean Outdoors
𝐹𝑨(𝑥) ∫ 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 𝐹𝑨(𝑥) ∫ 𝐹𝑨(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 𝐹𝐵(𝑥) ∫ 𝐹𝐵(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0






Table 4.8 New Party Problem - Mean Distribution Data 
x 
    
0 0 0.000 0.35 0.000 
20 0.35 0.000 0.35 7.000 
40 0.35 7.000 0.6 14.000 
70 0.6 17.500 0.6 32.000 
90 0.6 29.500 1 44.000 
100 1 35.500 1 54.000 
 
Table 4.9 New Party Problem - Calculation Results 




0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20 -6.000 -6.000 -8.000 -7.000 
40 -4.000 -6.000 -8.000 -7.000 
70 -7.000 -12.000 -17.000 -14.500 
90 -3.000 -12.000 -17.000 -14.500 
100 -6.000 -17.000 -20.000 -18.500 
 
          It is clear that both the following conditions are satisfied: 
(𝑎) ∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑩(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0 
𝑥
0
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,  






        
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,  
∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑩(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑩((𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 ∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐵(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0




𝑀𝐴(𝑥) 𝑀𝐵(𝑥) ∫ 𝑀𝐴(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0






∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝐵(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 < 0 𝑜𝑟 ∫ [𝐹𝑨(𝑡) − 𝐹𝑩(𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑥
0





∫ [𝑀1(𝑡) − 𝑀2(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≤ 0       
𝑥
0
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋.   
          Therefore (a) implies that A ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐵   and (b) implies that A ≻𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐵  . 
In other words, the Porch option is preferred than the Outdoors option in the 
sense of both SISD and CSISD. It is not necessary to calculate 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽  for the 
reason that A ≻𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐷 𝐵. In fact, both 𝛼 and 𝛽 equals to 0 for all cases where the 
condition of SISD is satisfied. 
          Different from the previous case, in this example both conditions for 
SISD and CSISD are met. As demonstrated in Property 3.7.1, any problem 
which meets the condition for SISD also meets the condition for CSISD, but 














In this thesis, the summarized concept of first-order and second-order 
stochastic dominance (Levy, 1992) and other newly published concepts 
including first-order imprecise stochastic dominance (Montes, Miranda, & 
Montes, 2014), almost stochastic dominance and fuzzy stochastic dominance 
are revisited. A brief discussion shows the necessity of a further notion of 
second-order imprecise stochastic dominance. The notion of imprecise 
stochastic dominance is extended to second-order to analyze more 
complicated problems including both cases regarding a pair of sets of 
probability measures or probability distributions with intervals of probability 
involved. This thesis proposes two definitions, namely second-order imprecise 
stochastic dominance (SISD) and compromised second-order imprecise 
stochastic dominance (CSISD). It also proposes two dominance-level 
indicators, namely 𝛼 and 𝛽, which may help decision maker understand the 
extent of confidence that he or she can put in the dominating alternative. After 
that, the relation between these two definitions and their properties in a 
number of scenarios are studied respectively. It is proven that SISD has stricter 
criteria than CSISD which leads to the fact that CSISD can be used in a wider 
range of situations. In addition, several cases are studied to show their 
application. 
5.2 CONTRIBUTION 
With the help of SISD and CSISD, the concept of imprecise stochastic 
dominance is enhanced. Decision makers may solve decision problems even if 
the information given is not precise. It is a useful tool to simplify decision 
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making problems with imprecise information because it is easy to derive the 
relations by looking at the lower and upper distributions instead of the whole 
sets of distributions. This tool becomes more and more useful when the 
number of distributions to be considered increases. 
5.3 LIMITATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
5.3.1 Problem of workload 
The workload to obtain the dominance-level indicators will increase when the 
number of distributions to be considered increases. This is due to the fact that 
the calculation of dominance-level indicators requires comparing almost each 
possible combination of possible scenarios from each alternative. When a 
large number of distributions need to be considered, if the condition of SISD is 
not satisfied, CSISD has to be applied and then it might be a challenge.  
5.3.2 Multi-criteria decision analysis under uncertainty 
Stochastic dominance is a decision making tool for the context of single-
criteria decision analysis. However, decision makers often face situation when 
more than one criterion must be considered.  
          The method of comparing two sets of distribution functions proposed 
above might be applied to the context of multi-criteria decision analysis. The 
idea is to normalize the x axis of the distributions for all criteria. All the 
distributions regarding different criteria for one alternative can be treated as 
one set.   
          Furthermore, multi-criteria decision analysis with imprecise information 
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Proof for rational choice under first-order stochastic dominance and non-
decreasing utility functions (Levy, 1992): 
Integrating by parts: 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] = ∫ 𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑥) = [𝑢(𝑥)𝐹(𝑥)]0
∞ − ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥,  
𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)] = ∫ 𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐺(𝑥) = [𝑢(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥)]0
∞ − ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥)𝑑𝑥, 
where 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)]and 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)] are expected utility.  
𝐹(0) = 𝐺(0) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹(∞) = 𝐺(∞) = 1, 




Therefore,   
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)]  = ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
= ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)[𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑑𝑥. 
Since   
𝐹 ≻𝐹𝑆𝐷 𝐺, 
then 
𝐹(𝑥) ≤ 𝐺(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐹(𝑥) < 𝐺(𝑥)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
For any non-decreasing function (the decision maker prefers more to less), 




𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)] > 0. 




















Proof for rational choice under second-order stochastic dominance and 
non-decreasing concave utility functions (Levy, 1992): 
Following similar steps in Appendix A: 
 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)]  = ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐺(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
= ∫ 𝑢′(𝑥)[𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑑𝑥. 
Continue integrating by parts: 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)]  














𝑢′(𝑥) ≥ 0 (𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠),   
𝑢′′ < 0 (𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
∫ [𝐺(𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0      
𝑥
−∞
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋,
𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐺(𝑡) ≠ 𝐹(𝑡)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 
then 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)]  > 0. 
Hence alternative X is preferred to alternative Y. 
